2010Yunchou yu guanliRequires access

Research on Managers' Incentive Mechanism under Different Risk Attitude Combination

Sun Shi-min

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Abstract

Nowadays,most researches on managers' incentive are based on principal-agent theory and assume that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk adverse.There is limitation of the hypothesis in real economic life.In order to study in detail,this paper classifies managers and principals into nine types according to their different risk attitudes.The conclusion that the principal is risk neutral or risk adverse or risk preference and the manager is risk adverse or risk preference not only explains the hypothesis of principal-agent theory,but also guides practice in more thinking for manager's incentive mechanism.

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What this paper is about

Nowadays,most researches on managers' incentive are based on principal-agent theory and assume that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk adverse.There is limitation of the hypothesis in real economic life.In order to study in detail,this paper classifies managers and principals into nine types according to their different risk attitudes.The conclusion that the principal is risk neutral or risk adverse or risk preference and the manager is risk adverse or risk preference not only explains the hypothesis of principal-agent theory,but also guides practice in more thinking for manager's incentive mechanism.

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Available abstract

Nowadays,most researches on managers' incentive are based on principal-agent theory and assume that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk adverse.There is limitation of the hypothesis in real economic life.In order to study in detail,this paper classifies managers and principals into nine types according to their different risk attitudes.The conclusion that the principal is risk neutral or risk adverse or risk preference and the manager is risk adverse or risk preference not only explains the hypothesis of principal-agent theory,but also guides practice in more thinking for manager's incentive mechanism.

Key concepts: Incentive, Principal (computer security), Preference, Mechanism (biology), Adverse selection, Principal–agent problem, Order (exchange), Risk neutral

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