Theoretical Analysis on Combination Incentive to Managers
Zhang Wan-ding
Abstract
Zhang Wan-ding
Abstract
This article focuses on the effect of non-material incentive and combination incentive to managers.The role of non-material incentive is firstly discussed,and the measuring model of non-material incentive is given.Then,the optimal model of the combination incentive to managers is built.On the base of the static analysis,the change meaning of relative parameters in the model is depply discussed,and the significance of combination incentive to managers is that managers' utility can be improved under the restraints of certainty material condition and incentive cost.Finally,some main conclusions are got.
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This article focuses on the effect of non-material incentive and combination incentive to managers.The role of non-material incentive is firstly discussed,and the measuring model of non-material incentive is given.Then,the optimal model of the combination incentive to managers is built.On the base of the static analysis,the change meaning of relative parameters in the model is depply discussed,and the significance of combination incentive to managers is that managers' utility can be improved under the restraints of certainty material condition and incentive cost.Finally,some main conclusions are got.
Key concepts: Incentive, Meaning (existential), Certainty, Incentive program, Risk analysis (engineering), Business, Computer science, Environmental economics