2011Zhongguo guanli kexueRequires access

Research on the Classification of Incentive Mechanism about Money Managers Based on Psychological Contract

Zhuang Xin-tian

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Abstract

This paper applies the psychological contract theory to resolve the money managers' incentives problem.By setting up the principle-agent model,firstly,the paper classifies the incentive mechanism about money managers according to the money managers' psychological contract under the symmetric information condition;Secondly,under the asymmetric information condition,the paper researches the classification of incentive mechanism about money managers according to their external feature,such as the risk preference,the cost of the job,the ability of investment and the risk of the fund,and the vary direction of the market environment;Finally,by extending to muti-agent,the paper reviews the impact of the cooperation of money managers on their incentive mechanisms.This research not only makes up the standard principle-agent theory,but also provides new ideas for motivation system design of money managers.

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What this paper is about

This paper applies the psychological contract theory to resolve the money managers' incentives problem.By setting up the principle-agent model,firstly,the paper classifies the incentive mechanism about money managers according to the money managers' psychological contract under the symmetric information condition;Secondly,under the asymmetric information condition,the paper researches the classification of incentive mechanism about money managers according to their external feature,such as the risk preference,the cost of the job,the ability of investment and the risk of the fund,and the vary direction of the market environment;Finally,by extending to muti-agent,the paper reviews the impact of the cooperation of money managers on their incentive mechanisms.This research not only makes up the standard principle-agent theory,but also provides new ideas for motivation system design of money managers.

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Available abstract

This paper applies the psychological contract theory to resolve the money managers' incentives problem.By setting up the principle-agent model,firstly,the paper classifies the incentive mechanism about money managers according to the money managers' psychological contract under the symmetric information condition;Secondly,under the asymmetric information condition,the paper researches the classification of incentive mechanism about money managers according to their external feature,such as the risk preference,the cost of the job,the ability of investment and the risk of the fund,and the vary direction of the market environment;Finally,by extending to muti-agent,the paper reviews the impact of the cooperation of money managers on their incentive mechanisms.This research not only makes up the standard principle-agent theory,but also provides new ideas for motivation system design of money managers.

Key concepts: Incentive, Mechanism (biology), Microeconomics, Investment (military), Preference, Economics, Mechanism design, Psychological contract

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