Study on the incentive system of independent directors
Lin Song, Dan Zhang, Yuan Li
Abstract
Lin Song, Dan Zhang, Yuan Li
Abstract
In China, due to the lack of the reputation incentive system, the salary system for independent directors plays an important role in improving the corporate governance. In this paper, the salary system for independent directors is thought of as an issue of the formation of equilibrium price in the process of market transaction. Then, this paper indicates that since the formation of our independent director mechanism is passive, only if restructuring the incentive system, can our corporate governance structure be improved.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In China, due to the lack of the reputation incentive system, the salary system for independent directors plays an important role in improving the corporate governance. In this paper, the salary system for independent directors is thought of as an issue of the formation of equilibrium price in the process of market transaction. Then, this paper indicates that since the formation of our independent director mechanism is passive, only if restructuring the incentive system, can our corporate governance structure be improved.
Key concepts: Salary, Incentive, Restructuring, Corporate governance, Reputation, Business, Industrial organization, Database transaction