Analysis on the Incompleteness of Moral Hazard Model
Yi Fang Tang, Ai He Wang, Yan Li, Yu Mei Hu
Abstract
Yi Fang Tang, Ai He Wang, Yan Li, Yu Mei Hu
Abstract
Moral hazard model is an important model in contract design. Starting from the result set of the moral hazard contract, this paper analyzes the incompleteness of moral hazard contract which is with great practical significance. Our results show that if the contracting parties can’t reach a consensus on the possible outcomes of the future (i.e. the result set of contract), some efficiency contract (or agreement) may not be realized.
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Moral hazard model is an important model in contract design. Starting from the result set of the moral hazard contract, this paper analyzes the incompleteness of moral hazard contract which is with great practical significance. Our results show that if the contracting parties can’t reach a consensus on the possible outcomes of the future (i.e. the result set of contract), some efficiency contract (or agreement) may not be realized.
Key concepts: Moral hazard, Hazard, Set (abstract data type), Actuarial science, Morale hazard, Economics, Business, Law and economics