The Study on Optimal Health Insurance Contracts with Moral Hazard
H Chen
Abstract
H Chen
Abstract
This paper studies people's selections of optimal hospital rating and quantity of medical service,and the possible moral hazard of choosing in the health insurance market of China,including public health insurance and commercial health insurance.People can get optimal health insurance contracts through the government's efforts to seek maximized utility function of the residents and reduce the moral hazard to choose hospital rating and quantity of medical service.And some suggestions to decrease moral hazard are also provided.
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This paper studies people's selections of optimal hospital rating and quantity of medical service,and the possible moral hazard of choosing in the health insurance market of China,including public health insurance and commercial health insurance.People can get optimal health insurance contracts through the government's efforts to seek maximized utility function of the residents and reduce the moral hazard to choose hospital rating and quantity of medical service.And some suggestions to decrease moral hazard are also provided.
Key concepts: Moral hazard, Morale hazard, Actuarial science, Government (linguistics), Business, Service (business), Casualty insurance, Group insurance