Health Insurance and Moral Hazard
Franck Bien
Abstract
Franck Bien
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.Classification JEL: D8, I1
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This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.Classification JEL: D8, I1
Key concepts: Morale hazard, Moral hazard, Actuarial science, Payment, Health risk, Business, Health insurance, Function (biology)