Vanguard of the Objective Force

The IBCT has been designed as a full spectrum, early combat ford The brigade has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all projected future threats, but it is optimized primarily for employment in smaller-scale contingencies in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. SINCE THE END of the Cold War, the Army has repeatedly proven its value to the nation through adaptive crisis-response in Southwest Asia, Africa, Central America and Southern Europe. Indeed, in virtually every contingency since 1989, landpower has proven essential to lasting decision. However, the high frequency of joint contingency operations in the 1990s-a frequency expected to continue and perhaps rise during the 21st centuryhas sharply increased the significance of strategic responsiveness. Clearly, Army forces are increasingly important to a joint force that can rapidly deploy to prevent, contain, stabilize or terminate a conflict in its early stages. In response to this new operational environment, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera and US Army Chief of Staff Eric K. Shinseki formulated a new Army Vision in October 1999 to build a strategically responsive landpower force capable of dominance across the full spectrum of operations. The Army will implement the vision using three-stage transformation campaign over the next 10 to 20 years, leading to an objective force that will incorporate revolutionary improvements. The Army's transformation campaign plan is the most challenging and significant effort to change the Army in more than a century. The interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs) now under development have been characterized as the vanguard of that future force. Why the IBCT and Why Now? Although the Army is capable of full-spectrum dominance, its organization and force structure are not optimized for strategic responsiveness. Army light forces-the best in the world-can deploy within days but lack the lethality, mobility and staying power necessary to assure decision. On the other hand, Army mechanized forces possess unmatched lethality and staying power but require too much time to deploy. The Army's 21 st-century responsibility for effective strategic responsiveness demands rapidly deployable combined arms forces that exploit information and human potential and combine advantages of both light and mechanized forces. Meeting this immediate requirement and providing warfighting commanders with an important new option for decisive contingency response is the central near-term objective of the Army's decision to develop full-spectrum medium-weight brigadesthe interim brigade combat teams. The IBCTs, operating within division structures, will provide a complementary capability to our current light and mechanized forces, serving as a bridging force un- til science and technology allow the Army to achieve objective force capabilities. The Army will rapidly and nearly simultaneously develop two initial brigade combat teams during the next two years using two existing bri-gades, one heavy and one light, at Fort Lewis, Washington. The accelerated development of these brigades will jump-start the implementation of the Army transformation strategy. In fact, as the vanguard of the objective force, these IBCTs will also incorporate many innovative concepts that will be fully op- erational within the objective force: * Commander- and execution-centric command and control environment. * Networked operations. * Multifunctional soldiers, leaders and staffs. * Effects-based planning. * Execution-focused, distribution-based sustainment. * Flattened hierarchies and integrated headquarters. Mission of the interim brigade combat team. The IBCT has been designed as a full-spectrum, early-entry combat force. The brigade has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all projected future threats, but it is optimized primarily for employment in smaller-scale contingencies (SSC) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. …