Air Mobility Command and the Objective Force: A Case for Cooperative Revolution

NOW IS A GOOD TIME to explore the correlation between US Army modernization programs and those of the US Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC). The Army is in the midst of a fundamental organizational and conceptual transition toward the Objective Force. Whatever its final form, the Objective will greatly depend on the ability to deploy rapidly by air.1 AMC likely will remain the Army's primary source for high-capacity airlift for both inter- and intratheater movement. Army aviation may evolve to provide specialized portions of the Objective Forces battlefield and perhaps theater air-mobility support. But any effort to replicate AMC's extensive capabilities in the common-- user fleet would be wasteful and doubtfully viable in the defense budget process. The Objective will not be established fully for 20 years or more. This corresponds roughly to the time required to develop and field any new required aircraft and support systems. It is time to review the Army and AMC modernization programs because the future Army will need abundant air-mobility support. AMC will be the source for most of that support, and there is time-perhaps just barely-to adjust one or both programs to accommodate emerging requirements and technological opportunities. The Objective Force's Air Mobility Requirements The Objective is the Army beyond 2010. The Objective concept emerged from an Army transformation process that began with the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1992, followed by the Army After Next development program that began in 1996, which was adjusted because of the Army's difficult mobility experience during the movement of Task Hawk in 1999. With the greater complexity of the strategic environment and rapid development of precision weapons, senior Army leaders saw the need for revolutionary change in doctrine, organization and equipment.2 Their vision is to develop a force that is deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable and dominant at every point along the spectrum of operations.3 The US Army chief of staff has called for these developments to enable our divisions ... to transition rapidly from one point on that spectrum of the future security environment to another.4 Deployability is an important element of this vision. AMC Commander Major General Charles S. Mahan Jr. stated recently, You are not relevant if you can't get to the fight.5 The Army's transition program has three main axes.6 The core axis consists of doctrinal and technological developments that lead to converting most of the Army's combat units into a standardized Objective configuration. Meanwhile, the Army continues to modernize its Legacy Force to preserve its combat capabilities until its units convert to the Objective standard. The Army's third transformation axis is a program to transition up to eight of its brigades into interim brigade combat teams. In the near term, this program will allow land commanders to deploy medium-weight, highly mobile forces to crises. The transitional brigades' intermediate objective is to provide unit platforms upon which to refine the Army's understanding of the Objective Force.7 In the long term, these units also should convert to the Objective standard. The distinguishing characteristics of transitional brigades and the Objective are their technological philosophies. The initial brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, are equipping as medium-- weight mechanized units based on off-the-shelf combat vehicles and other equipment. The interim brigades likely will field more-advanced interim armored vehicles and other materiel. The Objective Force's technological hallmark will be the Future Combat System (FCS). The FCS will be a common vehicle or system of vehicles whose variants will serve as main fire-support vehicles, troop carriers, engineer and transport vehicles, and perhaps self-propelled, indirect-fire-support platforms. …