Emerging Army Doctrine: Command and Control

IN MAY 1863, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, outnumbered more than two to one by the Union Army of the Potomac, defeated the Union Army in the of Chancellorsville. This victory was a victory of command and control (C2) rather than one of superior numbers. The Confederate commander, General Robert E. Lee, first had to understand the situation, then move to overcome his initial disadvantage, and finally use superior C2 to defeat his opponent. His victory also stemmed from the fact that the defeated Union commander, Major General Joseph Hooker, although he had seized the initiative in the campaign, displayed poor C2. This example illustrates the value of C2 in conducting successful military operations. The U.S. Army's modern operations and doctrine rely on superior C2 for success. As part of the emerging doctrine to support U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, the U.S. Army will publish C2 doctrine in the new FM 6-0, Command and Control.1 The decision to publish a separate C2 doctrinal FM was made because U.S. Army C2 doctrine has been relatively sparse in its higher doctrinal literature. The 1993 version of FM 100-5, Operations, discusses C2 under the heading, Battle and only amounts to a few pages.2 More C2 doctrine may be found in FM 101-- 5, Staff Organization and Operations, but this is still only about eight pages out of more than 200.(3) Consequently, subordinate branch and echelon manuals have had to develop their own definitions and details of C2, leading to multiple versions of C2 doctrine. A committee effectively decided the Army's C2 doctrine because it lacked a C2 FM to provide details for the concepts in FM 100-5. Joint Publication (JP) 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations, does not provide C2 doctrine explicitly.4 Other sources of joint C2 doctrine are JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), but there is not a single authoritative source.5 Moreover, C2 of land forces has unique requirements that joint doctrine does not address. In contrast, other services and armies have published C2 doctrinal manuals. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine Corps have all published their C2 doctrine in separate manuals-Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-8, Command and Control Doctrine; Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6, Naval Command and Control; and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control.6 The British Army has published its C2 doctrine in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 2, Command, as has the Canadian Armed Forces in Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 300(3), Command.7 FM 3-0 recognizes information explicitly as an element of combat power and sets guidelines on the meaning. Central to exercising C2, leaders use information to generate understanding and then use that understanding to make decisions that lead to effective actions. FM 6-0 amplifies those concepts in FM 3-0. Doctrine must guide the development and use of modern information technologies and their powerful ability to influence the conduct of operations. If not, the technology, or those developing the technology, will require the forces to exercise C2 its way. For example, during development of the Army Command System (ABCS), the contractors asked that doctrine be written to label all operation order (OPORD) annexes after F as F1, F2, and F3 because their program did not recognize OPORD annex designations higher than F. What is in the C2 FM FM 6-0 provides a common framework for C2 doctrine. This common framework is a common language and defines essential terms to discuss, describe, and develop C2 at schools and centers. It firmly establishes mission command as a C2 concept that best fits the doctrine of full-spectrum operations and uses modern technology to support soldiers. FM 6-0 centers on the commander rather than the staff and focuses on execution rather than planning in the operations process. …