FM 3-0: Doctrine for a Transforming Force

ON 14 JUNE 2001, the U.S. Army released its new operations manual, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations.1 This edition supersedes the 1993 edition of FM 100-5. It is number 14 in a series of Army field service regulations dating back to 1905 that provide basic operational doctrine for Army forces. FM 3-0 complements and expands on the Army doctrine contained in FM 1, The Army, also released on 14 June 2001.(3) As the Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 3-0 establishes a foundation for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in other Army manuals. Publishing both of the Army's top-end doctrinal manuals is not only unusual it is also unique. Typically, the revision and publication of FM 1 and FM 3-0 proceeded independently and out of cycle, as was the case with publishing FM 100-5 in June 1993 and FM 100-1 in June 1994.(4) This time, however, the coincidence of Army transformation, ongoing joint doctrine revision, and the decision to rewrite FM 100-5 precipitated a major doctrinal shift.5 FM I and FM 3-0 herald a top-to-bottom revision of Army doctrine that supports Army transformation. This revision is already well under way with the first of the supporting doctrinal publications, FM 3-90, Tactics, appearing in July 2001.(6) Additional supporting publications, such as FM 6-0, Command and Control, and FM 3-13, Information Operations, are nearing completion. FM 3-06, Urban Operations; FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations; FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; and FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, are in draft for Armywide staffing.7 Similar efforts are under way to rewrite FM 1-0, Personnel; FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations; FM 4-0, Combat Service Support; and FM 7-0, Training the Force.8 With this magnitude of doctrinal shift under way, this article places FM 3-0 in context and provides some insights into not only the doctrine contained in FM 3-0 but also why it has changed and the significance of the change. It examines the major conceptual changes in the doctrine. Whether one fully embraces the changes to Army keystone doctrine or not, comparing the new FM 3-- 0 with previous editions reveals a major shift in Army doctrine, arguably as significant as adopting AirLand Battle in 1982. Changes in content and context bear this out. This is the first edition of the operations manual to appear under the aegis of a mature and authoritative joint body of doctrine.9 For the first time, it defines Army mission-essential tasks lists (METLs), the operational expression of the Army core competencies found in FM 1. Additionally, FM 3-0 recognizes a profound shift in the operational environment and examines the increased complexity of modern operations from that perspective. In consonance with Army transformation, FM 3-0 recognizes that Army forces must be strategically responsive, not just deploying faster. To a greater degree than almost any doctrine since the Korean war, this doctrine is offensive, stressing operations that are more nonlinear and simultaneous. It discusses and illustrates operations conducted throughout expanded and noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs). Army operations are full spectrum, spanning decisive action in major theater war, peacetime military engagement, and domestic support activities. FM 3-0 is commander focused and expands the importance of battle command-the ability to visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess operations. Information technologies powerfully influence how commanders conceptualize the battlespace, how they plan and operate, and how they engage adversaries. The manual retains and restates hard-won lessons from 226 years of Army experience, revising and reapplying them in old and new ways. So, while it represents a significant shift in doctrine, it would be wrong to label the new edition as being revolutionary. Undoubtedly, some question the timing and argue that it may have been better for the Army to wait for the new administration's defense review results. …