2020•Frontiers Research of Architecture and EngineeringOpen access

Analysis of moral hazard in Engineering agent construction system

Lihua Wang, Shuguang Zhou, Yuetong Hui

Abstract

Analyze the moral hazard issues in the construction agency system, and enumerate the performance of moral hazard. Deeply analyze the causes, start with strengthening supervision and perfecting incentive measures, eliminate the impact of moral hazard, and give play to the advantages of agent construction.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Key concepts: Moral hazard, Agency (philosophy), Incentive, Hazard, Business, Risk analysis (engineering), Actuarial science, Engineering