On-Chip Protection of Cryptographic ICs Against Physical Side Channel Attacks: Invited Paper
Makoto Nagata
Abstract
Makoto Nagata
Abstract
Side channel attacks on semiconductor ICs have become a serious concern. This paper introduces design techniques of IC chips to realize on-chip detection and even disablement of malicious attempts for securing cryptographic devices. The protection against local electromagnetic attack (LEMA) and laser fault injection attack (LFIA) are demonstrated with Silicon measurements.
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Side channel attacks on semiconductor ICs have become a serious concern. This paper introduces design techniques of IC chips to realize on-chip detection and even disablement of malicious attempts for securing cryptographic devices. The protection against local electromagnetic attack (LEMA) and laser fault injection attack (LFIA) are demonstrated with Silicon measurements.
Key concepts: Side channel attack, Cryptography, Chip, Computer science, Embedded system, Channel (broadcasting), Computer security, Computer network