Designing Secure Cryptographic Circuits
Naofumi Homma
Abstract
Naofumi Homma
Abstract
Hardware security in mobile and embedded systems is drawing much attention in the context of the rapid growth of Internet-of-Things. In particular, the threats of side-channel attacks are non-trivial because they can be done by relatively low-cost equipment in a non-destructive manner. In the last few decades, a variety of side-channel attacks on cryptographic circuits have been reported. This paper introduces the design of cryptographic circuits resistant to side-channel attacks, including the-state-of-the-art side-channel attacks and circuit-level countermeasures.
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Hardware security in mobile and embedded systems is drawing much attention in the context of the rapid growth of Internet-of-Things. In particular, the threats of side-channel attacks are non-trivial because they can be done by relatively low-cost equipment in a non-destructive manner. In the last few decades, a variety of side-channel attacks on cryptographic circuits have been reported. This paper introduces the design of cryptographic circuits resistant to side-channel attacks, including the-state-of-the-art side-channel attacks and circuit-level countermeasures.
Key concepts: Side channel attack, Cryptography, Computer science, Computer security, Cryptographic primitive, Context (archaeology), Electronic circuit, Embedded system