2017•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access
Note on Unique Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Game
John Rehbeck
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John Rehbeck
Abstract
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Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Best response, Epsilon-equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Risk dominance, Symmetric equilibrium, Subgame