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Chapter 4: Refinement on Nash Equilibrium Solutions, Stackelberg Equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality

Dario Bauso

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Abstract

4.1 ▪ Introduction

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What this paper is about

4.1 ▪ Introduction

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Available abstract

4.1 ▪ Introduction

Key concepts: Risk dominance, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Equilibrium selection, Epsilon-equilibrium, Subgame, Best response, Subgame perfect equilibrium

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Chapter 4: Refinement on Nash Equilibrium Solutions, Stackelberg Equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality — Research Paper | ScholarLens