Pleasure and desire
Raphael Woolf
Abstract
Raphael Woolf
Abstract
Pleasure is the goal of life for an Epicurean. But it is pleasure of a particular kind that represents this goal, namely lack of pain in body ( aponia ) and lack of distress in soul ( ataraxia ). It is clear that, for Epicurus, to be free from bodily pain and mental distress is, in and of itself, to be in a state of pleasure. He does not recognize a neutral state of neither pleasure nor pain; for a percipient subject, being without pain is already pleasant. Equally, however, Epicurus does not hold that the only pleasure to be had is freedom from pain. The pleasures of the profligate, which he tells us do not represent the Epicurean goal ( Ep. Men. 131), certainly are pleasures as far as Epicurus is concerned, since he calls them that, though he adds that such pleasures do not generate a pleasant life - it is 'sober reasoning' that does so ( Ep. Men. 132).
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Pleasure is the goal of life for an Epicurean. But it is pleasure of a particular kind that represents this goal, namely lack of pain in body ( aponia ) and lack of distress in soul ( ataraxia ). It is clear that, for Epicurus, to be free from bodily pain and mental distress is, in and of itself, to be in a state of pleasure. He does not recognize a neutral state of neither pleasure nor pain; for a percipient subject, being without pain is already pleasant. Equally, however, Epicurus does not hold that the only pleasure to be had is freedom from pain. The pleasures of the profligate, which he tells us do not represent the Epicurean goal ( Ep. Men. 131), certainly are pleasures as far as Epicurus is concerned, since he calls them that, though he adds that such pleasures do not generate a pleasant life - it is 'sober reasoning' that does so ( Ep. Men. 132).
Key concepts: Pleasure, Epicureanism, Pain and pleasure, Pleasure principle, Subject (documents), Psychology, Aesthetics, Soul