Pleasure and affective components of mental states in the ancient and Epicurean hedonism
Mašan Bogdanovski, Ivan Nišavić
Abstract
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Mašan Bogdanovski, Ivan Nišavić
Abstract
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In this paper, we analyze the concept of pleasure in the period from 5th to 3rd century BC, and the development and understanding of this concept, from its officially first use in the Cyrenean philosophical discourses, up to the Epicurean discussions, which give pleasure a privileged status. Plato?s thoughts on pleasure are certainly not of any essential interest in his writings, but they are analyzed briefly here, because they may contribute to the more complete understanding of the attitude towards pleasure that was dominant in his time. This paper should yield, in addition to a historical perspective concerning the various interpretations and accounts of pleasure, a certain apology of the Epicurean account of pleasure. A hypothesis may be especially helpful, according to which Epicurus does not conceive pleasure as a mental state, but rather as an affective component of the corresponding mental states.
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In this paper, we analyze the concept of pleasure in the period from 5th to 3rd century BC, and the development and understanding of this concept, from its officially first use in the Cyrenean philosophical discourses, up to the Epicurean discussions, which give pleasure a privileged status. Plato?s thoughts on pleasure are certainly not of any essential interest in his writings, but they are analyzed briefly here, because they may contribute to the more complete understanding of the attitude towards pleasure that was dominant in his time. This paper should yield, in addition to a historical perspective concerning the various interpretations and accounts of pleasure, a certain apology of the Epicurean account of pleasure. A hypothesis may be especially helpful, according to which Epicurus does not conceive pleasure as a mental state, but rather as an affective component of the corresponding mental states.
Key concepts: Pleasure, Epicureanism, Hedonism, Pleasure principle, Aesthetics, Psychology, Philosophy, Epistemology