2022Unpublished venueRequires access

Maybe We’re Doing It Wrong

Emily A. Austin

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Abstract

Abstract This introductory chapter motivates the Epicurean view that living well is living for pleasure. Uncharitable critics have long misrepresented Epicurus as advocating the indiscriminate, wanton pursuit of bodily pleasure. In the spirit of charity, some defenders of Epicurus have overcorrected, transforming Epicurus instead into a kind of abstemious killjoy, a hedonist in name only. The truth lies somewhere in between. Epicurus thinks life offers a rich array of joyful pleasures, but fully appreciating those pleasures requires first achieving the greatest pleasure—tranquility, a stable state resulting from the absence of psychological pain and anxiety. If the best pleasure depends on freedom from anxiety, though, it seems we are often very, very bad at being pleased. This book explores what Epicurus thinks most contributes to our anxiety and unhappiness, both theoretically and practically, and how we can change our beliefs, desires, and physical circumstances to put the greatest pleasure within reach.

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Abstract This introductory chapter motivates the Epicurean view that living well is living for pleasure. Uncharitable critics have long misrepresented Epicurus as advocating the indiscriminate, wanton pursuit of bodily pleasure. In the spirit of charity, some defenders of Epicurus have overcorrected, transforming Epicurus instead into a kind of abstemious killjoy, a hedonist in name only. The truth lies somewhere in between. Epicurus thinks life offers a rich array of joyful pleasures, but fully appreciating those pleasures requires first achieving the greatest pleasure—tranquility, a stable state resulting from the absence of psychological pain and anxiety. If the best pleasure depends on freedom from anxiety, though, it seems we are often very, very bad at being pleased. This book explores what Epicurus thinks most contributes to our anxiety and unhappiness, both theoretically and practically, and how we can change our beliefs, desires, and physical circumstances to put the greatest pleasure within reach.

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Abstract This introductory chapter motivates the Epicurean view that living well is living for pleasure. Uncharitable critics have long misrepresented Epicurus as advocating the indiscriminate, wanton pursuit of bodily pleasure. In the spirit of charity, some defenders of Epicurus have overcorrected, transforming Epicurus instead into a kind of abstemious killjoy, a hedonist in name only. The truth lies somewhere in between. Epicurus thinks life offers a rich array of joyful pleasures, but fully appreciating those pleasures requires first achieving the greatest pleasure—tranquility, a stable state resulting from the absence of psychological pain and anxiety. If the best pleasure depends on freedom from anxiety, though, it seems we are often very, very bad at being pleased. This book explores what Epicurus thinks most contributes to our anxiety and unhappiness, both theoretically and practically, and how we can change our beliefs, desires, and physical circumstances to put the greatest pleasure within reach.

Key concepts: Pleasure, Epicureanism, Pain and pleasure, Aesthetics, Anxiety, Psychology, Psychoanalysis, Philosophy

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