Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and scepticism

The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein?s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein?s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type.