Can We Infer Naturalism from Scepticism?

Hume, like a number of more recent writers, claims that epistemological scepticism gives us reason to think that our beliefs are non‐epistemically determined. Because some body of propositions that we believe are all unjustifiable, the argument goes, our beliefs in those propositions must be determined by non‐truth‐conducive considerations. I argue initially that scepticism does not by itself entail Humean naturalism. I then then develop an argument from scepticism to naturalism which has considerable promise. This more complex argument is built around two considerations: (i) if a subject accepts a local sceptical argument against one of his beliefs and still does not give it up, then we have very good, if not conclusive, reason to think that his belief is non‐epistemically determined; (ii) it seems initially plausible that global scepticism can have no affect on the beliefs it targets, even if we were to accept it. Unfortunately, however, even this argument ultimately fails to establish any connection between scepticism and Humean naturalism.