Severing the Snake's Head: The Question of Air Power as a Political Instrument in the Post-Cold War Security Environment

Is American air power sliding toward irrelevancy in the security environment that the United States confronts as it moves into the twenty-first century? Attitudes of certain senior airmen about the application of air power in the new security environment suggest that it is sliding in that direction. The recent use of air power in Kosovo demonstrates that many airmen understand the application of air power in war and conflict as an impenetrable package of military force that policy should not hinder or constrain once it puts air power into action. Yet contemporary military operations in Somalia and the Balkans strongly suggest that policy will permeate the range of military actions from tactical to strategic. Retired Air Force Major General Charles Link recently commented that in Kosovo the political leadership should have turned the running of the air war over to a “competent” air commander. The actual air commander of the Kosovo campaign, Lieutenant General Michael C. Short, boasted that if left up to him he would have “severed” the head of the snake by launching a quick and overwhelming air attack on Serbian infrastructure. Such an approach, argued the General, would have ended the war much sooner on NATO terms. The attitudes of airmen like Generals Short and Link show that they believe that policy should not restrain or limit the application of air power once it commits it to action. Historical experience and air power theories have contributed mightily to this flawed conception. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted almost two hundred years ago that policy has a continuing and permeating influence on war. American airmen and other military leaders should heed Clausewitz’s most profound insight if they want to maintain the relevancy of their military forces to the security of the nation.