Towards a Flexible Theater Air Warfare Doctrine

"Billy Mitchell was right." These words hung in the foyer of the Air Force Air Command and Staff College during Desert Storm, reflecting the belief that air power had finally come of age in the skies over Iraq. As the nation learned of one successful air strike after another, it became obvious that something was significantly different about America's latest war. Expectations rose that Coalition Air Forces could win a decisive victory without the need for a costly ground assault. That the air campaign did not obviate the need for a ground offensive has not stopped post-war speculation that a few more days or weeks of strategic air attacks might have led to Saddam's capitulation. This essay traces the theoretical underpinnings of the Desert Storm strategic air campaign, examines its key assumptions, and reviews barriers to developing a more flexible doctrine for future limited conflicts. Air Force strategic air warfare doctrine is rooted in the theories of the earliest air power advocates, including Giulio Douhet, Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell, and the men of the Air Corps Tactical School. Although theory has continued to evolve in response to technological advances, these advocates' core belief that air power could win a decisive victory without the need to first destroy an enemy's army was also a key assumption of the Desert Storm strategic air campaign plan. In fact, the initial Air Force campaign proposal did not target Saddam's Republican Guard divisions, a critical center of gravity. As the Air Force develops joint air warfare doctrine for the 21st Century, it must ensure it remains relevant for executing options against a wide range of potential conditions and centers of gravity. This will require Air Force airmen to challenge their deeply rooted beliefs on how air power can best support the joint campaign, as well as strategic air warfare's linkage to the Air Force as an independent service.