Game Studying of Project Bid Invitation and Bidding
Zhilei Wang
Abstract
Zhilei Wang
Abstract
This paper uses the game theory to study the reason why tenders choose the lowest price bidder's in the course of project bid invitation and bidding.The more bidder there are,the bidding price would will be closer to the project cost.Without incentive mechanism and efficient monitoring constrain,bidders must choose practices fraud,so this paper proposes and sets up the incentive mechanism under meeting tender's greatest expected utility.
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This paper uses the game theory to study the reason why tenders choose the lowest price bidder's in the course of project bid invitation and bidding.The more bidder there are,the bidding price would will be closer to the project cost.Without incentive mechanism and efficient monitoring constrain,bidders must choose practices fraud,so this paper proposes and sets up the incentive mechanism under meeting tender's greatest expected utility.
Key concepts: Bidding, Call for bids, Incentive, Microeconomics, Real-time bidding, Game theory, Mechanism (biology), Tender offer