bid invitation and bidding
FU Xiao-ling
Abstract
FU Xiao-ling
Abstract
Game between bidders and inviter may be known as a Uncompleted Static Game in project bid invitation bidding. Under asymmetric information, if there is no incentive precaution, bidders will take fraud in project bid inv itation bidding. By analysis the relation between project bid invitation bi dding and Game Theory, this paper suggests the basis of theory for bidders takin g fraud, and it formulates a set of incentive mechanism including Incentive-Comp atibility constraint and Individual Incentive-Compability constraint to make inv iter's revenue be maximum.
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Game between bidders and inviter may be known as a Uncompleted Static Game in project bid invitation bidding. Under asymmetric information, if there is no incentive precaution, bidders will take fraud in project bid inv itation bidding. By analysis the relation between project bid invitation bi dding and Game Theory, this paper suggests the basis of theory for bidders takin g fraud, and it formulates a set of incentive mechanism including Incentive-Comp atibility constraint and Individual Incentive-Compability constraint to make inv iter's revenue be maximum.
Key concepts: Bidding, Incentive, Revenue, Constraint (computer-aided design), Game theory, Business, Microeconomics, Real-time bidding