2012•Journal of North China Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric PowerRequires access

Research on the Honest Bidding Incentive Mechanism Model Design in Engineering Bidding Documents

Liang Jia-bin

Abstract

In view of the adverse selection problem caused by information asymmetry in bidding,the paper analyzes the information asymmetry between the bidder and the tender,and designs a honest bidding incentive mechanism model.The analysis of the model reveals the basic principle the bidders must obey to ensure the honest bidding.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Bidding, Incentive, Information asymmetry, Adverse selection, Mechanism design, Mechanism (biology), Incentive compatibility, Microeconomics