Controlling about the projects of venture investment
Zhou Zi-xue
Abstract
Zhou Zi-xue
Abstract
Due to the double-agency relationship in the venture investment behaviors, projects of venture investment have to be controlled in two sides: one is venture investors' controlling the venture enterprises, the other thing is the venture capital owners' controlling of the venture investment institutes. This article analyzes the control models adopted in some countries; puts forward that positive-interference should be applied in Chinese venture investment enterprises. At last the article draws a fundamental blueprint of the financial report system for Chinese venture investment fund
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Due to the double-agency relationship in the venture investment behaviors, projects of venture investment have to be controlled in two sides: one is venture investors' controlling the venture enterprises, the other thing is the venture capital owners' controlling of the venture investment institutes. This article analyzes the control models adopted in some countries; puts forward that positive-interference should be applied in Chinese venture investment enterprises. At last the article draws a fundamental blueprint of the financial report system for Chinese venture investment fund
Key concepts: Venture capital, Social venture capital, Blueprint, Investment (military), Business, Finance, Pre-money valuation, Agency (philosophy)