Study on food safety supervision based on evolutionary game theory
Lei Xunpin
Abstract
Lei Xunpin
Abstract
The author uses a method of evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of food safety supervision aiming at the food supervision process,and also reveals the interactive behavior and stable state of different strategy selection from supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food through analyzing dynamic trend and stability of replicator dynamics equation. The results show that increasing the supervision,punishment and social responsibility for the enterprises providing food and strengthening the awareness of social responsibility of the enterprises providing food,can promote the benign interaction between the supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food to achieve the evolutionary stable strategy( ESS). Finally,Pareto optimality can be realized to jointly ensure food safety.
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The author uses a method of evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of food safety supervision aiming at the food supervision process,and also reveals the interactive behavior and stable state of different strategy selection from supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food through analyzing dynamic trend and stability of replicator dynamics equation. The results show that increasing the supervision,punishment and social responsibility for the enterprises providing food and strengthening the awareness of social responsibility of the enterprises providing food,can promote the benign interaction between the supervision department of food safety and the enterprises providing food to achieve the evolutionary stable strategy( ESS). Finally,Pareto optimality can be realized to jointly ensure food safety.
Key concepts: Replicator equation, Evolutionary game theory, Food safety, Punishment (psychology), Business, Game theory, Process (computing), Evolutionarily stable strategy