2011•Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and SciencesRequires access

Evolutionary game analysis of food safe supervision

Tian Shuang-liang

Abstract

Based on evolutionary game theory,the asymmetric game model of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise is established.The local stability of the replication dynamic equations is analyzed and obtains the evolutionary condition of the behavior selection in decision-making of the supervisory departments and food production enterprise,and some suggestions of food safety are given.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Replication (statistics), Evolutionarily stable strategy, Production (economics), Evolutionary game theory, Selection (genetic algorithm), Game theory, Food processing, Food safety