Study on Safety Production Supervision Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Shen Bin
Abstract
Shen Bin
Abstract
The article discusses the set up of the evolutionary game model to analyze the safety production regulating effect.It is found based on the model and data experiment:①the amount of the fine that the governmental safety supervision departments receive if the accident occurs obviously affects the evolutionary results.②the amount of the safety production investment has great influences on the evolutionary results.
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The article discusses the set up of the evolutionary game model to analyze the safety production regulating effect.It is found based on the model and data experiment:①the amount of the fine that the governmental safety supervision departments receive if the accident occurs obviously affects the evolutionary results.②the amount of the safety production investment has great influences on the evolutionary results.
Key concepts: Production (economics), Investment (military), Evolutionary game theory, Set (abstract data type), Accident (philosophy), Game theory, Evolutionary theory, Industrial organization