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A Fundamental Framework of Coalition Formation Theory

Xiaobin Li

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Abstract

In order to study coalition formation with subcoalitions in n－ person cooperative games with transferable utilities, this paper presents a fundamental framework of coalition formation theory. The concept of coalition tree is introduced. The feasible movement of subcoalitions and players is discussed. Given a fixed payoff distribution rule, the equilibrium coalition tree is defined. Under the linear power distribution rule, the existence of an equilibrium coalition tree is proved.

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What this paper is about

In order to study coalition formation with subcoalitions in n－ person cooperative games with transferable utilities, this paper presents a fundamental framework of coalition formation theory. The concept of coalition tree is introduced. The feasible movement of subcoalitions and players is discussed. Given a fixed payoff distribution rule, the equilibrium coalition tree is defined. Under the linear power distribution rule, the existence of an equilibrium coalition tree is proved.

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Available abstract

In order to study coalition formation with subcoalitions in n－ person cooperative games with transferable utilities, this paper presents a fundamental framework of coalition formation theory. The concept of coalition tree is introduced. The feasible movement of subcoalitions and players is discussed. Given a fixed payoff distribution rule, the equilibrium coalition tree is defined. Under the linear power distribution rule, the existence of an equilibrium coalition tree is proved.

Key concepts: Mathematical economics, Stochastic game, Tree (set theory), Computer science, Order (exchange), Distribution (mathematics), Solution concept, Game theory

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