2007Transactions of Beijing Institute of TechnologyRequires access

A Method of Allocation Among Players in Coalition Structure Based on the Shapley Value

Qiang Zhang

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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to seek a new method of profit allocation for games with coalition structure.By presenting the limitation of the model of Owen coalition structure,the model of two levels cooperative games with coalition structure is established when the grand coalition cannot be created and the characteristic functions are not supperadditive.The rule of allocation of feasible coalition structure is constructed and the relative properties are proved.The new rule of allocation guarantees the realization of both individual rationality and collective rationality and becomes a necessary condition to keep the coalition structure stable.The validity of the method is verified by a numerical example.

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What this paper is about

The aim of the paper is to seek a new method of profit allocation for games with coalition structure.By presenting the limitation of the model of Owen coalition structure,the model of two levels cooperative games with coalition structure is established when the grand coalition cannot be created and the characteristic functions are not supperadditive.The rule of allocation of feasible coalition structure is constructed and the relative properties are proved.The new rule of allocation guarantees the realization of both individual rationality and collective rationality and becomes a necessary condition to keep the coalition structure stable.The validity of the method is verified by a numerical example.

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Available abstract

The aim of the paper is to seek a new method of profit allocation for games with coalition structure.By presenting the limitation of the model of Owen coalition structure,the model of two levels cooperative games with coalition structure is established when the grand coalition cannot be created and the characteristic functions are not supperadditive.The rule of allocation of feasible coalition structure is constructed and the relative properties are proved.The new rule of allocation guarantees the realization of both individual rationality and collective rationality and becomes a necessary condition to keep the coalition structure stable.The validity of the method is verified by a numerical example.

Key concepts: Shapley value, Rationality, Mathematical economics, Cooperative game theory, Transferable utility, Profit (economics), Realization (probability), Computer science

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