2017•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access
Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game
Dmitry Levando
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Dmitry Levando
Abstract
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Key concepts: Mathematical economics, Core (optical fiber), Nash equilibrium, Stochastic game, Cooperative game theory, Transferable utility, Shapley value, Solution concept