A Study on the Incentive Issue of Governmental Fiscal Subsidy to Enterprises' R&D Investment——A Game Analysis Based on Principal-agent Framework

The asymmetric information brings about a dilemma for the government as regards enterprises' RD Investment in the principal-agent relationship. Based on the analysis on game motivation,the game process consists of two stages: game of incomplete information in advance and game of imperfect information afterwards. The game in advance involves both sides choosing the proper strategies by establishing a benefit matrix. The game afterwards involves the government designing contract under the constraint condition to stimulate the enterprises to keep their promises on RD investment. The game analysis shows that the enterprises have a greater power to make adverse selection when the signaling cost of innovative enterprises is low,or the difference of rate of subsidization between original innovation and secondary innovation is obvious. In addition,the preferential tax rate for innovative enterprises decreases with the increasing effort costs. Therefore,the government should take actions,such as strengthening the investment on human capital,establishing and perfecting the supervision and accountability,perfecting the contracts and intellectual property protection act,to reduce the game costs and improve the output-input ratio of RD.