The Empirical Studies of the Effects on Incentive of Supervisors and Independent Directors to the Two Types of Agency Costs
Zan Li
Abstract
Zan Li
Abstract
Supervisors and independent directors are outside of the listed company equity incentive object,but there are still scholars believe that the implementation of equity incentive for supervisors and independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs.Based on this,the authors obtain 1437 balanced panel data of 479 listed companies from 2009 to 2011,building a multiple regression model,analyzing the effects on incentive of supervisors and independent directors to the two types of agency costs under the interaction of the corporate governance factors.The study found that the incentives of supervisors and independent directors failed to play a role of governance in the two types of agency problem considering the interaction of the corporate governance factors.Finally,under the premise of the necessity for motivate,we put forward some suggestion to improve the incentive effect from the remuneration and reputation.
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Supervisors and independent directors are outside of the listed company equity incentive object,but there are still scholars believe that the implementation of equity incentive for supervisors and independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs.Based on this,the authors obtain 1437 balanced panel data of 479 listed companies from 2009 to 2011,building a multiple regression model,analyzing the effects on incentive of supervisors and independent directors to the two types of agency costs under the interaction of the corporate governance factors.The study found that the incentives of supervisors and independent directors failed to play a role of governance in the two types of agency problem considering the interaction of the corporate governance factors.Finally,under the premise of the necessity for motivate,we put forward some suggestion to improve the incentive effect from the remuneration and reputation.
Key concepts: Incentive, Remuneration, Corporate governance, Reputation, Accounting, Business, Agency (philosophy), Premise