The Analysis of Controlling Shareholders Behavior on the Transfer of Corporate Control Right
Liu Ai-ju
Abstract
Liu Ai-ju
Abstract
In the countries of having greater shortcoming of market system and having weaker investor protection, the unit cost of acquiring control benefits is reduced and the occuring rate of control benefits raised. It eventually caused that takeover behavior of pursuing value maximum was twisted and ineffective takeover frequently taked place.Therefore ,standardizing and balancing controlling stakeholders behavior should start with the shortcoming of market system and establishment of corresponding legal system.
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In the countries of having greater shortcoming of market system and having weaker investor protection, the unit cost of acquiring control benefits is reduced and the occuring rate of control benefits raised. It eventually caused that takeover behavior of pursuing value maximum was twisted and ineffective takeover frequently taked place.Therefore ,standardizing and balancing controlling stakeholders behavior should start with the shortcoming of market system and establishment of corresponding legal system.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Control (management), Business, Investor protection, Unit (ring theory), Value (mathematics), Transfer (computing), Monetary economics