Control Transfer,Controlling Shareholder and Benefits Expropriation by Large-shareholder Evidence from Takeover of Top Management
Shi Shui-ping
Abstract
Shi Shui-ping
Abstract
The specific emphasizing that owned by public system as dominant position inside the share system reshuffles and administration approve and limit control of stocks publishes institution,resulting in serious problem of listed-company control by controlling shareholder in our country.Especially behind listed-company control transfer,controlling shareholder adopts a series of measure to encroach small shareholder benefits.This thesis conducts research on the relationship between controlling shareholder and benefits expropriation by large shareholder after control transfers.We find that:(1) the ratio of takeover of directors,the ratio of takeover of top management and controlling shareholder control ratio have a positive relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder after control transfer;(2) the top shareholder holding ratio has a pour U type relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder obviously after control transfer;(3) In the ultimate control entity,the local government and family control firms have a positive relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder,and the central government and other control firms have a negative relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder related,but not obvious,which offers some good evidence for our country's property reforms and investor protect in the future.
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The specific emphasizing that owned by public system as dominant position inside the share system reshuffles and administration approve and limit control of stocks publishes institution,resulting in serious problem of listed-company control by controlling shareholder in our country.Especially behind listed-company control transfer,controlling shareholder adopts a series of measure to encroach small shareholder benefits.This thesis conducts research on the relationship between controlling shareholder and benefits expropriation by large shareholder after control transfers.We find that:(1) the ratio of takeover of directors,the ratio of takeover of top management and controlling shareholder control ratio have a positive relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder after control transfer;(2) the top shareholder holding ratio has a pour U type relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder obviously after control transfer;(3) In the ultimate control entity,the local government and family control firms have a positive relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder,and the central government and other control firms have a negative relationship with benefits expropriation by large shareholder related,but not obvious,which offers some good evidence for our country's property reforms and investor protect in the future.
Key concepts: Expropriation, Shareholder, Private benefits of control, Business, Shareholder loan, Control (management), Accounting, Monetary economics