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The Analysis of Controlling Shareholder's Behavior Based on Control Benefits in Corporate Takeover

TU Qiao-ping, Caiyu Zhang

Abstract

The literature on motives of takeover has showed that shared benefits and private benefits of control is main motive of large shareholders.In the countries with greater shortcoming of market system and investor protection,the unit cost of acquiring control benefits reduces and the occurring rate of control benefits rises.It eventually causes that takeover behavior of pursuing maximizing shareholders,wealth is twisted and inefficacious takeover frequently take place.Therefore,standardizing and balancing controlling shareholder's behavior should start from reducing the deficency of market system and from establishing corresponding legal system.

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Key concepts: Shareholder, Private benefits of control, Control (management), Business, Market for corporate control, Investor protection, Unit (ring theory), Cost–benefit analysis