2010•Cai-mao yanjiuRequires access

Control of the Largest Shareholder,Identity and Incentive Pay

Kebin Deng

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

Identity between major shareholders and managers in firms is the managers' unique incentive method. To put identity and only One Dominant Shareholder into managers' incentive improves the principle-agent model. This paper describes the optimal incentive and discusses the relationship between manages' identity and incentive pay under three conditions. Moreover,it analyzes the relationship of managers' identity,incentive pay and the value of the firm,and the relationship of shareholding proportion of major shareholders,managers' incentive mechanism and the value of the firm.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Identity between major shareholders and managers in firms is the managers' unique incentive method. To put identity and only One Dominant Shareholder into managers' incentive improves the principle-agent model. This paper describes the optimal incentive and discusses the relationship between manages' identity and incentive pay under three conditions. Moreover,it analyzes the relationship of managers' identity,incentive pay and the value of the firm,and the relationship of shareholding proportion of major shareholders,managers' incentive mechanism and the value of the firm.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Identity between major shareholders and managers in firms is the managers' unique incentive method. To put identity and only One Dominant Shareholder into managers' incentive improves the principle-agent model. This paper describes the optimal incentive and discusses the relationship between manages' identity and incentive pay under three conditions. Moreover,it analyzes the relationship of managers' identity,incentive pay and the value of the firm,and the relationship of shareholding proportion of major shareholders,managers' incentive mechanism and the value of the firm.

Key concepts: Incentive, Shareholder, Identity (music), Business, Value (mathematics), Incentive program, Control (management), Microeconomics

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Control of the Largest Shareholder,Identity and Incentive Pay — Research Paper | ScholarLens