2011•Unpublished venueRequires access

The study on engineering supervision incentive system based on asymmetric information

Yugui Cao, Huanhuan Wang

Abstract

The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers' investment, special character of engineering supervisors and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervisors are put forward.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Incentive, Compensation (psychology), Investment (military), Principal (computer security), Scale (ratio), Information asymmetry, Computer science, Variable (mathematics)