2008•Journal of Economic TheoryRequires access
Mechanism design with collusive supervision
Gorkem Celik
Open publisher page 60 citations
Abstract
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Gorkem Celik
Abstract
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OpenAlex reports 60 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
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Key concepts: Supervisor, Principal (computer security), Stochastic game, Adverse selection, Benchmark (surveying), Principal–agent problem, Mechanism (biology), Microeconomics