2002•Journal of Tianjin University Science and TechnologyRequires access

Research on the Principal-Agent Problem About the Insurance Agency Market

Shen Zhang

Abstract

Based on the principal agent theory, this paper studies the principal agent relationship on the insurance agency market. And then, three typical principal agent problems of the insurance agency market are analyzed, that is, moral hazard, adverse selection and profit seeking. In addition,it also discusses the establishment of incentive mechanism and considering the existence of asymmetric information in the insurance agency market, gives some advice about drawing up an optimal incentive contract simultaneously.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Adverse selection, Principal–agent problem, Moral hazard, Agency (philosophy), Incentive, Principal (computer security), Private information retrieval, Business