Efficient Bargains and Currency Devaluation*
Ching‐chong Lai, Juin‐jen Chang, Wen‐Ya Chang
Abstract
Ching‐chong Lai, Juin‐jen Chang, Wen‐Ya Chang
Abstract
This paper proposes a new route, namely efficient bargains between the union and the firm over wage and employment, to shed light on the contractionary effects of a currency devaluation. It is found that a currency devaluation will definitely depress the supply of domestic goods when the union and the firm negotiate an efficient wage‐employment contract. Thus our result can be regarded as a theoretical vehicle for explaining the empirical findings of the contractionary devaluation.
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This paper proposes a new route, namely efficient bargains between the union and the firm over wage and employment, to shed light on the contractionary effects of a currency devaluation. It is found that a currency devaluation will definitely depress the supply of domestic goods when the union and the firm negotiate an efficient wage‐employment contract. Thus our result can be regarded as a theoretical vehicle for explaining the empirical findings of the contractionary devaluation.
Key concepts: Devaluation, Negotiation, Currency, Economics, Currency union, Wage, Monetary economics, International economics