Coalition composition and legislative outcomes in Italy

This article considers the connections between executive and legislative coalitions in Italy and poses the question of the extent to which the characteristics of coalitions affect legislative outcomes. Executive decree laws are used as an indicator of cabinet policy proposals, and the relationship between the successful conversion of decrees by parliament and the contours of the governing coalition are explored. The separability of executive and legislative coalitions is strongly suggested by the analysis, which is somewhat consistent with experiences in other Western European countries. That is caused less by tensions between the two institutional arenas than by disputes among those parties present in both the legislature and the executive and internal to those parties. When examining the period in which decree laws were used most frequently (1983–94), the number of parties in the executive coalition is strongly and positively linked to successful conversion of government decree laws. That finding buttresses the conclusions of Laver and Shepsle that credibility is a key factor in coalition behaviour and that surplus majority cabinets are often crucial to maintain cabinet and policy credibility.