2011International Journal of Constitutional LawOpen access

The definition of Parliament after Jackson: Can the life of Parliament be extended under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949?

Craig J. Forsyth

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Abstract

There were differences of view in the House of Lords in R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] U.K.HL. 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262 over whether it was possible, by utilizing the procedure under section 2 of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, for the House of Commons by unilateral vote to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years. The logic of Jackson suggests that this could be done. But while the majority of their Lordships understandably resisted this conclusion they failed to provide full grounds consistent with the continuing supremacy of Parliament for this view. This article, basing itself upon Harris v. Minister of the Interior 1952(2) SA 429(A), argues that the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 defined Parliament in such a way that the extension of the life of Parliament required enactment by both houses of Parliament. This approach gives meaning to the limit on the life of Parliament while preserving the supremacy of Parliament.

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There were differences of view in the House of Lords in R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] U.K.HL. 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262 over whether it was possible, by utilizing the procedure under section 2 of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, for the House of Commons by unilateral vote to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years. The logic of Jackson suggests that this could be done. But while the majority of their Lordships understandably resisted this conclusion they failed to provide full grounds consistent with the continuing supremacy of Parliament for this view. This article, basing itself upon Harris v. Minister of the Interior 1952(2) SA 429(A), argues that the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 defined Parliament in such a way that the extension of the life of Parliament required enactment by both houses of Parliament. This approach gives meaning to the limit on the life of Parliament while preserving the supremacy of Parliament.

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There were differences of view in the House of Lords in R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] U.K.HL. 56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262 over whether it was possible, by utilizing the procedure under section 2 of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, for the House of Commons by unilateral vote to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years. The logic of Jackson suggests that this could be done. But while the majority of their Lordships understandably resisted this conclusion they failed to provide full grounds consistent with the continuing supremacy of Parliament for this view. This article, basing itself upon Harris v. Minister of the Interior 1952(2) SA 429(A), argues that the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 defined Parliament in such a way that the extension of the life of Parliament required enactment by both houses of Parliament. This approach gives meaning to the limit on the life of Parliament while preserving the supremacy of Parliament.

Key concepts: Parliament, House of Commons, Law, Political science, Politics

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