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1998•European Economic ReviewRequires access

Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment

Pierre‐André Chiappori, Franck Durand, Pierre‐Yves Geoffard

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Key concepts: Copayment, Moral hazard, Natural experiment, Economics, Medical care, Hazard ratio, Hazard, Morale hazard

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