Evaluating the Threat of Withdrawal from the NPT
Aaron Haviland
Abstract
Aaron Haviland
Abstract
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains a commitment to nuclear disarmament that, some analysts claim, may lead dissatisfied Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to withdraw from the treaty in protest. But what would be the consequences of such a move, and would any of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States actually ever take such a step? Aaron Haviland traces a history of the treaty, scrutinises the likelihood of withdrawal on a normative basis, and weighs the implications for disarmament.
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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains a commitment to nuclear disarmament that, some analysts claim, may lead dissatisfied Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to withdraw from the treaty in protest. But what would be the consequences of such a move, and would any of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States actually ever take such a step? Aaron Haviland traces a history of the treaty, scrutinises the likelihood of withdrawal on a normative basis, and weighs the implications for disarmament.
Key concepts: Disarmament, Treaty, Nuclear weapon, Normative, Political science, Law, Arms control, Nuclear ethics