The future of nuclear weapons without nuclear testing
Richard L. Garwin
Abstract
Richard L. Garwin
Abstract
The impact of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on U.S. security concerns is assessed in this article. Three technical issues specific to nuclear weapons are addressed: (1) safety and reliability of the existing U.S. arsenal, (2) constraints on the development of new types of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and other nations, and (3) prevention of further proliferation of weapons. Political aspects of the treaty, including the policy interpretation of the U.S. and other nations, are also examined. Based on the U.S. interpretation of the treaty, conclusions of the analysis include: (1) stockpiles can be maintained safely and reliably for several decades, (2) nuclear weapons states will be unable to develop radically new designs of nuclear weapons, and (3) non-nuclear weapons states could build weapons under the treaty but in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.
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The impact of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on U.S. security concerns is assessed in this article. Three technical issues specific to nuclear weapons are addressed: (1) safety and reliability of the existing U.S. arsenal, (2) constraints on the development of new types of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and other nations, and (3) prevention of further proliferation of weapons. Political aspects of the treaty, including the policy interpretation of the U.S. and other nations, are also examined. Based on the U.S. interpretation of the treaty, conclusions of the analysis include: (1) stockpiles can be maintained safely and reliably for several decades, (2) nuclear weapons states will be unable to develop radically new designs of nuclear weapons, and (3) non-nuclear weapons states could build weapons under the treaty but in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.
Key concepts: Treaty, Nuclear weapon, Arms control, Political science, Nuclear ethics, International trade, Interpretation (philosophy), Law