Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence

= Purpose + Method + Endstate. should have five should have two It's Aftragstaktik made simple for the masses. should be a structured should be informal. THESE STATEMENTS about commander's intent, some of them obviously contradictory, were collected a few years ago from Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CASE) students and Army War College (AWC) students-all combat amps officers. Their understanding of commander's intent clearly demonstrates that although the concept of intent has been in our doctrine for quite a while, confusion still exists. Yet, there has been little empirical investigation into the process of communicating intent. After a brief review of what Army doctrine and other literature have to say about intent, this article will present the sobering findings of one study that investigated the communication of intent in four active-duty combat arms battalions. Next, the artide will propose a method to help commanders improve their ability to communicate intent to their subordinates. Finally, the article will argue that the process of communicating intent is subordinate to another process known as imparting presence. Commander's Intent in Doctrine and: Practice Although US Army commanders have long used intent to guide the actions of subordinates, it has only recently been formally included in doctrine. Commander's intent first appeared in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in 1982.3 During the 1970s, the military tended to centralize decision making. Events such as the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran signaled the need to empower subordinate commanders on the scene. Army doctrine writers used the German army's Aftragstaktik, first introduced in the early 19th century, as a model for today's concept of commander's intent. Aftragstaktik, best translated as mission-oriented command, was developed in response to the French revolution and Napoleon's method of waging war, which swept away the traditional armies and their linear tactics, iron discipline, blind obedience and intolerance of independent action.2 According to J. L. Silva, Aftragstaktik was not a set of procedures but a philosophy, a social norm within the German army. At its foundation was the realization that battle is marked by confusion and German army leaders consciously traded assurance of control for assurance of self induced action. These leaders developed a military cultural norm that supported and expected decisive action by subordinates in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity. Fundamental to the success of Aftragstaktik in the German doctrine was trust. Silva writes: Trust between superior and subordinate is the cornerstone of mission-oriented command superior trusts his subordinate to exercise his judgment and creativity, to act as the situation dictates to reach the maximum goal articulated in his mission; the subordinate trusts that whatever action he takes in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole will be supported by his superior.' Silva indicates that such confidence in subordinates stems from the superior's intimate personal knowledge of each one. German senior commanders knew that such knowledge was essential to implementing Aftragstaktik. In formalizing Aftragstaktik into US Army doctrine, the fullness of the concept was diluted. 1993 version of FM 100-5 defines commander's intent, but there is no discussion of social norms, expectations, trust or intimate personal knowledge of subordinates. Instead, FM 100-5 focuses on structure and content rather than process. The commander's intent describes the desired endstate. It is a concise statement of the purpose of the operation and must be understood two levels below the level of the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. …