Azimuth Check: Where are we with Commander's Intent.

This monograph examines why many commanders continue to have problems writing effective commander's intent statements. Doctrine writers reintroduced "Commander's intent" to United States Army doctrine with the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations. Fourteen years have passed since then and many commanders’ intent statements that appear in orders are still meaningless words for staffs and subordinate commanders. The "Commander's Intent" White Paper describes commander's intent as the cornerstone of mission tactics and critical to Army operations. The commander's intent is probably the most important thing a commander must communicate to his subordinates. Feedback from the combat training centers reveals that many of the intent statements do not reflect a clear vision of how commanders intend to accomplish their mission. The monograph investigates four areas that shed light on the commander's intent concept and how it is defined, taught, and practiced in today's Army. The first section is a discussion of the theoretical basis and historical precedent for the commander's intent concept. Commander's intent is a key element of a decentralized command and control philosophy. This section identifies the characteristics of the nature of war that led many commanders to adopt a decentralized command and control philosophy and how that philosophy developed in Army doctrine. The next section surveys the current and emerging doctrinal literature as a foundation to understanding the current debate about the commander's intent doctrine and TRADOC's solution. The next step is to understand how the TRADOC schools interpret the doctrine and their current strategy for teaching the doctrine as a battle command competency in the Army's professional military education (PME) system. Understanding what is written and how it is taught, frames the examination of the problems with commander's intent encountered in the field. From this examination, possible causes of the problem are identified and recommended solutions are presented. Finally, the monograph considers several possible reasons why many commanders are having problems developing effective commander's intent statements. The investigation goes beyond the doctrinal definition of the concept; it also examines how the current definition is taught in TRADOC schools, and commanders' ability to visualize the battle.